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his ote e plores how Con ress can respond to a president who
withholds non covert intelli ence operations from the con ressional
intelli ence committees in violation of the ational Security Act. his ote
proposes a novel solution for Con ress the elevation of the Gan of Ei ht into
a oint permanent select committee that is authori ed to file suit on behalf of
Con ress. Con ressional lawsuits are likely to be challen ed on the basis of
standin . Gan of Ei ht lawsuits could empower con ressional leaders tomeet
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f all our recommendations, stren thenin con ressional oversi ht may
be amon the most difficult and important. So lon as oversi ht is overned
by current con ressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American
people will not et the security they want and need.1The 9 11 Commission ReportINTROD CTIONIn 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authori ed its enhancedinterrogation techniques program. nder this program, the CIA, DefenseIntelligence Agency, and other components of the military tortureddetainees at black sites around the world.2 Although the National SecurityAct requires the president to keep the House Permanent Select Committeeon Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence(SSCI) fully and currently informed of . . . intelligence activities, 3 neithercommitteewas informed about the CIA’s program. Instead, theWhite House
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTAC S PON THE .S., THE 9 11 COMMISSION REPORT419 (2004).2. See, e. ., Vicki Divoll, Opinion, Con ress s orture Bubble, N.Y. TIMES (May 12,2009), https: www.nytimes.com 2009 05 13 opinion 13divoll.htmlhttps: perma.cc 73CR- RR hereinafter Divoll, Con ress s orture
Bubble .3. 50 .S.C. 3091(a)(1) (2018).
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briefed ust four congressional leaders, and it was understood that theywere not to speak about the program with anyone, including theircolleagues on the intelligence committees. 4This Note explores how congressional leaders can respond to apresident who refuses to inform the congressional intelligence committeesabout an intelligence community (IC) program in accordance with theNational Security Act. Specifically, this Note investigates whether eightcongressional leaders, known as the Gang of Eight, could seek redress in theudiciary. Such suits would invariably present the courts with some verydifficult urisdictional questions. 5 Congressional leaders may be interestedin filing suit against a president who unlawfully refuses to inform theintelligence committees about an IC program. Yet under the status quo,individual congressional leaders are unlikely to have standing to sue theexecutive.6This Note proposes a novel solution for Congress: the elevation of theGang of Eight into a oint permanent select committee ( Gang of EightCommittee ) that is explicitly authori ed by Congress to issue subpoenasand sue the executive. This structure would conform with recent case lawregarding legislative standing and increase the likelihood thatcongressional leaders could seek redress in the udiciary. Congressionallawsuits against the executive on national security issues are not novel,7 andCongress, as an institution, has expressed interest in suing the executive.8
4. Divoll, Con ress s orture Bubble, supra note 2.5. R. Lawrence Dessem, Con ressional Standin to Sue Whose ote s his,
Anyway , 62 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) (quoting Reuss v. alles, 584 F.2d461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).6. See, e. ., lumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that 215members of Congress did not have standing to assert the institutionalinterests of Congress) nited Presbyterian Church in the .S.A. v. Reagan, 738F.2d 1375, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding a member of Congress lackedstanding to challenge an executive order) Harrington v. ush, 553 F.2d 190,199 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a member of Congress lacked standing toen oin the CIA from engaging in allegedly unlawful activities).7. See, e. ., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 .S. 996 (1979) (challenging PresidentCarter’s termination of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty) Holt manv. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (challenging President Nixon’sCambodian Campaign) ucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011)(challenging President Obama’s authori ation of military force in Libya).8. See, e. ., Zivotofsky e rel. Zivotofsky v. erry, 576 .S. 1, 45 (2015) (notingthe Senate as amicus) nited States v.Windsor, 570 .S. 744 (2013) (allowingipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives to defend
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Particularly in light of the Trump administration’s resistance tocongressional oversight,9 the elevation of the Gang of Eight would be anatural response for a Congress interested in protecting its oversightcapacity.Other scholars have previously examined how Congress might improveits oversight over the IC.Many have argued that structural changes to HPSCIand SSCI, such as reforming the intelligence budget process and improvingthe expertise of committee members and staff, are key to improvingcongressional oversight.10 Others have advanced innovative legalarguments, such as the idea that Congress has a constitutional right toobtain any information it needs to oversee the IC.11 And at least one author
the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act) INS v. Chadha, 462 .S.919, 922 (1983) (recogni ing the appearance of the Senate and House ofRepresentatives).9. See erry W. ircher, rump s nprecedented Fi ht to Withhold nformation,ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2019), https: www.theatlantic.com ideas archive 201908 house-needs-its-subpoena-power-against-trump 596857https: perma.cc ME6L-C 4T ( The Trump administration . . . has set itselfapart . . . in the unprecedented degree to which it has resisted congressionaloversight. ).10. See, e. ., Christopher Estep, For House, Senate ational Security Committees,
Stop aps for erm Limits, ST SEC RITY (Feb. 24, 2020),https: www. ustsecurity.org 68735 for-house-senate-national-security-committees-stopgaps-for-term-limits https: perma.cc A2 R-D4(arguing that intelligence committee term limits should be eliminated) atinaSlavkova, n Search of Good ntelli ence versi ht, GOV’T AFFAIRS INST. ( an. 9,2019), https: gai.georgetown.edu in-search-of-good-intelligence-oversighthttps: perma.cc 3N 4- 8RV (suggesting that Congress increase staffresources for the intelligence committees, eliminate term limits for members,and adopt a dedicated intelligence spending panel) Amy . Zegart, he Roots
of Weak Con ressional ntelli ence versi ht, HOOVER INST.,https: www.hoover.org sites default files research docs future-challenges- egart.pdf https: perma.cc 5 - 3W8 (noting that much ofCongress’s oversight troubles are a result of limited expertise and weakbudgetary power over the intelligence community).11. See Vicki Divoll, he Full Access Doctrine Con ress s Constitutional Entitlement
to ational Security nformation from the E ecutive, 34 HARV. .L. P . POL’Y493, 497 (2011) (arguing that Congress is entitled to seek and receive anyinformation from the executive branch that it needs to carry out its coreresponsibilities to make laws, appropriate funds, and investigate all mattersand that this power is at its enith in the areas of intelligence policies and the
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recogni ed that, among other potential areas for future research,Congress might review the role of the Gang of Eight.12 This Note is the firstexamination of whether Congress could formali e the Gang of Eight toimprove Congress’s oversight over the IC. Although most proposedstructural changes have focused on the existing congressional intelligencecommittees, this Note argues that the creation of the Gang of EightCommittee could uniquely improve the effectiveness of the existingintelligence committees.Part I of this Note will explore the current landscape of congressionaloversight over the IC. Part II will expound on this Note’s novel proposal: theelevation of the Gang of Eight to a oint permanent select committee. ThisPart will explain how Congress would create the Gang of Eight Committeeand explain why providing congressional leaders with the subpoena powerwould effectively promote congressional oversight of the IC. Furthermore,Part II will briefly survey legislative standing and argue that recent case lawmay require Congress to undertake structural changes to successfully filesuit against the president. Part III will address a number of legitimatecriticisms of the Gang of Eight Committee, arguing that the Gang of EightCommittee is politically feasible and would effectively improvecongressional oversight of the IC. ecause the modern Congress hasdemonstrated an interest in suing the executive, the effectiveness of Gangof Eight lawsuits may be instructive for the role of the udiciary in settlingdisputes between Congress and the president.PART I: CONGRESS’SOVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMM NITYThis Part examines the president’s statutory authority to withhold ICprograms from Congress. The legal requirements for congressionalnotification of IC activity are largely set by theNational Security Act of 1947,as amended. This Act requires the president to ensure that thecongressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informedof . . . intelligence activities. 13 Nonetheless, until the 1970s, Congress did
activities of the President and the agencies of the intelligence community )hereinafter Divoll, Full Access Doctrine .12. See Carrie Cordero, Enhancin Con ressional ntelli ence Committee
Effectiveness, CTR. NEW AM. SEC. (Aug. 5, 2019),https: www.cnas.org publications reports enhancing-congressional-intelligence-committee-effectiveness https: perma.cc FGD7-THZS .13. 50 .S.C. 3091(a)(1) (2018).
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not take much interest in conducting oversight of the IntelligenceCommunity. 14In 1974, the ew York imes revealed that the CIA had conducted amassive, illegal domestic intelligence operation against the antiwarmovement.15 In response, the Senate initiated an investigation led bySenator Frank Church. As the CIA itself acknowledges, the ChurchCommission found that the CIA had breached legal boundaries and violatedthe rights of .S. citi ens, particularly when it kept files on members of theantiwar movement. 16 In response to these revelations,17 Congressestablished the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)18 and theHouse Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).19The President is statutorily obligated to inform HPSCI and SSCI of allnon-covert IC operations.20Nonetheless, the executive branch has withheldboth covert and non-covert IC programs from Congress. The ChurchCommission investigation demonstrated that congressional oversight maybe necessary to ensure that the IC operates lawfully a concern that existstoday. For example, President ush did not informHPSCI and SSCI when heauthori ed the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques program. WhenCongress eventually learned of this program’s existence, SSCI conducted afull-scale investigation. In 2014, SSCI released its Committee Study of the
14. MICHAEL E. DEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45421, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OFINTELLIGENCE: AC GRO ND AND SELECTED OPTIONS FOR F RTHER REFORM, at ii(2018).15. Seymour M. Hersh, Hu e C. .A. peration Reported in .S. A ainst Antiwar
Forces, ther Dissidents in i on Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1974),https: www.nytimes.com 1974 12 22 archives huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html https: perma.cc YC8Y-8 ( The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter,conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the NixonAdministration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups inthe nited States . . . . At least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress wasamong those placed under surveillance by the C.I.A. ).16. he C A and Con ress Creation of the SSC , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Dec.8, 2011), https: www.cia.gov news-information featured-story-archive 2011-featured-story-archive the-cia-and-congress-creation-of-the-ssci.html https: perma.cc 8E Y-ZAMD .17. Devine, supra note 14 at 3-4.18. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted).19. H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong. (1977) (enacted).20. See supra Section I. .
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Central ntelli ence A ency s Detention and nterro ation Pro ram.21 Thesix-thousand page report, which took four years and cost forty-milliondollars to complete,22 acknowledges that t he use of the CIA’s enhancedinterrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurateinformation or gaining detainee cooperation and t he interrogations ofCIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented topolicymakers and others. 23 Like the CIA’s operations in the 1970s, a lack ofcongressional oversight empowered the IC to act unlawfully. This Part willexamine the president’s statutory requirements to inform Congress of ICprograms and evaluate how the president’s decision to unlawfully withholdIC operations undermines congressional oversight.
A. he President CanWithhold Covert perations from Con ressIn the Intelligence Authori ation Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Congressrequired the Director of Central Intelligence to:keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and thePermanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House ofRepresentatives . . . fully and currently informed of all intelligenceactivities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or arecarried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity ofthe nited States . . . .24At first glance, this language appears expansive. However, the Act creates asignificant carveout. When the president deems it essential to limit priornotice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the
21. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE ST DY OF THE CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288, S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014),https: fas.org irp congress 2014 rpt ssci-rdi.pdfhttps: perma.cc P5T - HL .22. See Spencer Ackerman et al., Senate Report on C A orture Claims Spy A ency
Lied About neffective Pro ram, G ARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014, 5:15 PM),https: www.theguardian.com us-news 2014 dec 09 cia-torture-report-released https: perma.cc 2 G - YA .23. C A orture Report Fast Facts, CNN (Sep. 26, 2018, 8:24 AM),https: www.cnn.com 2015 01 29 us cia-torture-report-fast-facts index.html https: perma.cc 3SD -R9HT .24. Pub. L. No. 96-450, 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (codified as amended at50 .S.C. 3091 (2018)).
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nited States, 25 he may withhold a sensitive covert operation from thecongressional intelligence committees.Covert operations are defined in 50 .S.C. 3093(e) as activities of thenited States Government to influence political, economic, or militaryconditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the nited StatesGovernment will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. 26 Non-covertoperations, regulated under section 3092, are defined as any IC programthat does not fall under section 3093(e). Critically, covert operations do notcover activities for which the primary purpose is to acquire intelligence,such as the CIA’s torture program.27If the president decides to withhold a covert operation from theintelligence committees, he has two choices. First, he may choose to informthe Gang of Eight. Second, he may fully withhold the operation fromCongress so long as he fully inform s the intelligence committees in atimely fashion and provide s a statement of the reasons for not givingprior notice. 28 The Gang of Eight consists of the chairman and rankingminority members of the House and Senate intelligence committees, thema ority and minority leaders of the Senate, and the Speaker and minorityleader of the House.29 The intent of this carveout appeared to some to beto provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree ofoperational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. 30nder 50 .S.C. 3093, the president must personally authori e covertoperations through a presidential finding.31 Generally, the president mustinform the congressional committees of such a finding as soon as possibleafter such approval but before the initiation of the covert actionauthori ed by it.32 Yet, as aforementioned, the president retains statutory
25. d.26. 50 .S.C. 3093 (2018).27. d see Heidi itrosser, Con ressional versi ht of ational Security Activities
mprovin nformation Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1054 (2008).28. 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(3) (2018)29. See 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(2) (2018).30. MARSHALL C RTIS ERWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40691, SENSITIVE COVERTACTIONNOTIFICATIONS: OVERSIGHTOPTIONS FORCONGRESS, at ii (2013).31. The goal of the presidential finding is to specify and reduce to writing theob ectives of the proposed action and to detail the government agencies andany third parties that will be involved. Samuel . Rascoff, Presidential
ntelli ence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 706-07 (2016).32. 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(1) (2018).
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authority to inform only the Gang of Eight,33 to whom he must provideustification for withholding the presidential finding from the intelligencecommittees.34 Furthermore, within 180 days of submitting suchustification, the president must either inform the intelligence committeesof his presidential finding or submit an additional statement of reasons tothe Gang of Eight explaining why it is essential to continue to limit accessto such finding or such notification to meet extraordinary circumstancesaffecting vital interests of the nited States. 35However, Congress has no statutory authority to force the president tocomport with the requirements of the National Security Act. Furthermore,the Gang of Eight cannot effectively oversee IC programs on its own. Itsmembers do not have the time or resources to personally review largevolumes of information in the course of an investigation. 36 nder the statusquo, congressional leaders have limited bargaining power to counter thedecisions of the executive over sensitive IC programs.
B. on covert C perations Must Be Briefed to Con ressThe president is not statutorily authori ed to withhold non-covertoperations fromCongress. Section 3092,which covers intelligence activitiesother than covert actions, is remarkably different from section 3093.Section 3092 establishes that the Director of National Intelligence shallkeep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currentlyinformed of all intelligence activities, other than a covert action which arethe responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalfof, any department, agency, or entity of the nited States Government. 37Section 3092 provides no statutory authority for the president to withholdnon-covert operations from the intelligence committees.Nonetheless, historical practice and congressional acquiescence haveenabled the president towithhold non-covert IC operations fromHPSCI andSSCI. Sometimes, the White House will brief the Gang of Four rather than
33. 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(2) (2018).34. See 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(5)(A) (2018).35. 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(5)( )(ii) (2018).36. Susan Hennessey Helen lein Murillo, he Rules of Con ressional
nvesti ations and rump s Growin Russia Problem, LAWFARE (Mar. 2, 2017,5:09 PM), https: www.lawfareblog.com rules-congressional-nvestigations-and-trumps-growing-russia-problem https: perma.cc AV5-6T 2 .37. 50 .S.C. 3092(a)(1) (2018).
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the intelligence committees. Gang of Four briefings are typically informal,oral briefings provided to the chairman and ranking members of HPSCI andSSCI regarding particularly sensitive non-covert intelligence activities.38Although Gang of Four notifications are not statutorily authori ed, theygenerally are accepted by congressional leadership and the White House.39And while these briefings give the executive branch a scapegoat if acontroversial program becomes public, they provide absolutely nothingto assist Congress in the performance of its lawmaking, appropriations, andoversight duties. 40 ecause Gang of Four notifications are not statutorilypermitted, there are no statutory requirements governing when thepresident must subsequently inform the intelligence committees about theparticular non-covert operation.
C. he mpact of Con ressional Leadership otificationsriefings to the Gang of Eight and the Gang of Four (hereinaftercongressional leadership notifications ) allow the president to informonlya select group of congressional leaders. When an IC program is briefed tocongressional leaders, but not to the intelligence committees, Congress’scapacity to conduct oversight of the IC is naturally diminished.Congressional leadership notifications do not ask Congress to approveparticular IC programs their goal is simply to inform congressionalleaders about the program’s existence. As Speaker of the House NancyPelosi explained, W hen the administration notifies Congress in thismanner, it is not seeking approval. There is a clear expectation that theinformation will be shared with no one, including other members of theintelligence committees. 41It is currently unclear whether congressional leaders have any meansof regulating an IC program that is unlawfullywithheld from the intelligencecommittees. Presidents ush, Obama, and Trump have all usedcongressional leadership notifications to undermine congressionaloversight.
38. See MARSHALL C RTIS ERWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40698, GANG OF FO RCONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCENOTIFICATIONS (2013).39. d.40. See Divoll, Full Access Doctrine, supra note 11, at 535.41. Nancy Pelosi, Opinion, he Gap in ntelli ence versi ht, WASH. POST ( an. 15,2006), https: www.washingtonpost.com archive 2006 01 15 the-gap-in-intelligence-oversight 217d7899-c9f3-45a0-a2e9-d93150359e37https: perma.cc AND4- 74G .
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President George W. ush used congressional leadership notificationsto prevent Congress from regulating highly sensitive IC programs. OnOctober 4, 2001, President ush issued a Top Secret PresidentialAuthori ation to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, directing theNational Security Agency (NSA) to use its signals intelligence capabilities toprevent further terrorist attacks on American soil.42 In brief, the presidentwas permitting the NSA to collect large amounts of metadata on Americanciti ens. At the time of issuance, it was unclear whether this PresidentialAuthori ation complied with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act(FISA).43On October 25, 2001, White House officials briefed the Gang of Four onthe President’s Surveillance Program (PSP).44 This non-covert IC programwould remain secret from the public and most members of Congress forover four years. During that period, at least one senator (the Vice-Chairmanof SSCI, no less) expressed concern that the program may be illegal.45 In2005, the PSP was leaked by the ew York imes.46 In the aftermath, somemembers of the intelligence committees expressed anger at not beinginformed about the program while congressional leaders argued that theywere powerless to stop it.47
42. OFFICES OF THE INSPECTORSGEN.OF THEDEP’T OFDEF. ET AL., NCLASSIFIEDREPORTONTHE PRESIDENT’S S RVEILLANCE PROGRAM, REP. NO. 2009-0013-A (2009),https: fas.org irp eprint psp.pdf https: perma.cc 7AHT- L .43. d. at 10-12. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 .S.C. 1801, et seq.,was enacted in 1978 to provide legislative authori ation and regulation forall electronic surveillance conducted within the nited States for foreignintelligence purposes. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3977.44. OFFICES OF THE INSPECTORSGEN. OF THEDEP’T OFDEF. ET AL., supra note 42.45. Letter from .S. Senator ohn Rockefeller to Vice President Dick Cheney ( uly17, 2013), https: fas.org irp news 2005 12 rock121905.pdfhttps: perma.cc 6VZ -T4R7 .46. ames Risen Eric Lichtblau, Bush Let .S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 16 2005),https: www.nytimes.com 2005 12 16 politics bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.html https: perma.cc FR3 -W3V .47. Pelosi, supra note 41 (defending her failure to ob ect to warrantlesssurveillance) Glenn Thrush ohn resnahan, Pelosi Defense Couldn t b ect
in , POLITICO (May 11, 2009) http: www.politico.comnews stories 0509 22401.html https: perma.cc 5 9-LGG (providingPelosi’s defense for her failure to ob ect to torture). But see Mike Soraghan,
Reyes Backs Pelosi on ntel Briefin s, HILL (May 1, 2009),
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In a separate instance in 2002, only the Gang of Four was notified whenthe CIA authori ed its enhanced interrogation techniques program.48Eachmember received an oral briefing, and it was understood that they werenot to speak about the program with anyone, including their colleagues onthe committees. 49Although President Obama claimed that his administration was themost transparent administration in history, 50 he too used the president’sauthority to withhold IC programs from the intelligence committees. Forexample, prior to the raid to kill Osama in Laden, only the Gang of Eightwas notified, although not all were briefed at the same time. 51Gang of Eight notifications have continued under the Trumpadministration. In May 2017, the F I opened a counterintelligence probeinto whether President Trump was being used as a Russian asset. 52 TheF I initially informed only the Gang of Eight that it was investigating thepresident.53If congressional leadership wanted to ob ect to any of these programsor activities, what could they have done The short answer is very little.For the Gang of Four to have waved their arms and yelled at mid-level C.I.A. briefers, or written harsh letters to the president and
https: thehill.com homenews news 19462-reyes-backs-pelosi-on-intel-briefings https: perma.cc Z9P-LR4 (Rep. Pete Hoekstra, the thenRanking Member of HPSCI, argued alternatively that the notion that thepresident doesn’t listen to the requests of congressional leaders is nuts ashe at least once complained to then-President ush and got a policychanged. ).48. See Divoll, Full Access Doctrine, supra note 11, at 535.49. See Divoll, Con ress s orture Bubble, supra note 2.50. onathan Easley, bama Says His s Most ransparent Administration Ever,HILL (Feb. 14, 2013), https: thehill.com blogs blog-briefing-room news 283335-obama-this-is-the-most-transparent-administration-in-history https: perma.cc N4 -324 .51. OHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41809, OSAMA IN LADEN’S DEATH:IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2011).52. Caitlin Oprysko, McCabe Con ressional Leaders Didn t b ect to
Counterintelli ence nvesti ation of rump, POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2019),https: www.politico.com story 2019 02 19 mccabe-gang-of-eight-counterintelligence-investigation-trump-1173821 https: perma.cc YF 6-PRPE .53. d.
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vice president, would have been useless. Fourmembers do not havethe ability, on their own, to bring the great weight of theconstitutional authority of Congress to bear.54Congressional leaders have argued that congressional leadershipnotifications prevent Congress from conducting effective oversight.Speaking about President ush’s surveillance program, Senator ayRockefeller argued that the ush administration’s secrecy preventedmembers of Congress fromconductingmeaningful oversight of the legal andoperational aspects of the program. 55 Meanwhile, Representative aneHarman claimed that that some congressional leadership notificationsviolate the specific requirements of the National Security Act of 1947. 56The president’s ability to withhold information from the intelligencecommittees upsets the balance of power between Congress and thepresident. In ivotofsky e rel. ivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court heldthat, even within areas of traditional executive control such as foreignaffairs, some decisions may still require congressional action. 57 Thepresident’s power over national securitymatters is not absolute Congressought to be able to seek udicial enforcement of the notificationrequirements of the National Security Act.
D. Elimination of the Gan of Ei ht Carve out s nlikelyThere is tension between the president’s capacity to withholdinformation from the intelligence committees and Congress’s ability toeffectively oversee the IC. One obvious solution would be for Congress toeliminate the Gang of Eight provision contained in 50 .S.C. 3093(c)(2).Alternatively, Congress might consider amending sections 3091-3093 in avariety of ways, such as establishing automatic consequences if thepresident fails to report an IC program to Congress. Perhaps unsurprisingly,both President George W. ush and President Obama strongly opposedefforts by Congress to amend the Gang of Eight provision.
54. See Divoll, Con ress s orture Bubble, supra note 2.55. Michael German, ed., Stren thenin ntelli ence versi ht, RENNAN CTR. FORSTICE 10 (2015), https: www.brennancenter.org sites default files analysis Church Committee Web.pdf https: perma.cc 9H E-D YG (quotingPress Release, Senator ohn D. ( ay) Rockefeller (Dec. 19, 2005) (commentingon the Terrorist Surveillance Program)).56. d.57. 576 .S. 1, 45 (2015).
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The FY 2007 Intelligence Authori ation Act would have required thepresident to inform the intelligence committees of all covert actions, or at aminimum, inform the committees of instances in which theywere not beingfully informed of a program (and the reasons behind the refusal).58Additionally, the bill would have conditioned the use of intelligence fundson congressional notification.59 The ush administration ob ected to thisbill. In a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP), theWhite House arguedthat an all-or-nothing approach to executive notification to congressionalintelligence committees would discourage, rather than encourage, thesharing of extraordinarily sensitive information. 60 The administration alsowarned that, if the bill were presented to the president, senior advisorswould recommend that he veto it . 61The Obama White House also opposed eliminating congressionalleadership notifications. During HPSCI’s mark-up of the IntelligenceAuthori ation Act for Fiscal Year 2010,62 the committee eliminated thesection 3093(c)(2) Gang of Eight provision.63 The White House swiftlyresisted. On uly 8, 2009, the Obama administration released an SAP statingthat i f the final bill presented to the President contains the revisednotification procedure , the President’s senior advisors would recommenda veto. 64 ltimately, this provision was abandoned. Although the Gang ofEight carve-out remains in place, it is unsurprising that the executive branchwould resist statutory changes increasing Congress’s oversight capabilitiesat the cost of executive independence.
58. athleen Clark, A ew Era of penness Disclosin ntelli ence to Con ress
nder bama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 313, 323 (2010).59. S. 372, 110th Cong. 307 (2007), https: www.congress.gov bill 110th-congress senate-bill 372 text https: perma.cc 9 YZ-467E .60. OFFICE OF MGMT. DGET, E EC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OFADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 372 INTELLIGENCEA THORIZATIONACT FOR FISCAL YEAR2007 (Apr. 12, 2007), https: www.hsdl.org view did 472505https: perma.cc L67C-FE39 .61. d.62. H.R. REP. NO. 111-186 321, at 10 (HPSCI committee report on IntelligenceAuthori ation Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 2701, 111th Congr. (2010)).63. Erwin, supra note 30, at ii.64. OFFICE OF MGMT. DGET, E EC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OFADMINISTRATION POLICY, H.R. 2701 - INTELLIGENCE A THORIZATION ACT FOR FISCALYEAR 2010 ( uly 8, 2009) https: obamawhitehouse.archives.govsites default files omb legislative sap 111 saphr2701r 20090708.pdfhttps: perma.cc M989-VMFC .
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nder both the ush and Obama administrations, Congress was unableto muster the political wherewithal to overcome the president’s threatenedveto. An obvious criticism of Gang of Eight lawsuits is that, if they are notpolitically feasible, they are practically unimportant. In Part III, this Notewill argue that the Gang of Eight Committee is a viable concept. This Note’sproposal can be enacted by a simple ma ority of Congress and will provideCongress with an effective tool to increase oversight of the IC.PART II: THE FORMATION OF THE GANG OF EIGHT COMMITTEECongress possesses the authority to enact the Gang of Eight Committeeand empower it with the subpoena power. This structure could enablecongressional leaders to file suit against the executive when the presidentunlawfully withholds IC programs from Congress. Congress has historicallyused the udiciary to protect its investigatory powers, and the Gang of EightCommittee is situated amongst this long-established precedent.
A. Con ress Can nilaterally Create the Gan of Ei ht CommitteeThe 1946 Legislative Reorgani ation Act created the currentframework for congressional committees.65 Select committees are oftenestablished to focus on issues that do not cleanly fit within any existingcommittee’s urisdiction.66 They can be either temporary or permanent(e.g., HPSCI). oint committees consist of both senators and representatives.
65. VALERIEHEITSH SEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-241, COMMITTEETYPES ANDROLES 1(2017).66. For example, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence wasestablished in the 95th Congress (H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong. (1977)) and theHouse Permanent Select Committee on Aging was created in the 93rdCongress (H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. (1974)).
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While oint committees often exist for housekeeping purposes,67 they arealso used to conduct research68 and even to consider legislative proposals.69The Constitution empowers each chamber of Congress with plenarypower over its own rules.70 To create a committee, the House and Senatemust each pass a separate resolution amending each chamber’s standingrules. These resolutions require a simple ma ority vote. However, in theSenate, cloture can be invoked only by vote of two-thirds of Senatorsvoting, with a quorum present. 71 In other words, a filibuster can hold upthe creationof any committee. Part III of thisNotewill addresswhy theGangof Eight Committee is politically feasible, even in the current politici ed era.After creating the Gang of Eight Committee, congressional leaders mustestablish its structure and internal procedures. The Committee should beled, like other oint committees,72 by a rotating chairperson, such as thechairmen of HPSCI and SSCI. Typically, each Congress is divided into twoannual sessions.73 During the first Session, the House would have the chairand the Senate would retain the vice-chair. The roles could reverse duringthe second Session. ecause the Committeewould serve both theHouse andSenate equally, its leadership structure should represent both chambers.
67. For example, the oint Committee on Printing is responsible for managing theGovernment Printing Office while the oint Committee on the Libraryadministers the Library of Congress. See HEITSH SEN, supra note 65, at 2.68. The oint Economic Committee researches the current economic situationwithin the nited States and for proposing improvements. oint Econ. Comm.,
About Joint Economic Committee, .S. CONGRESS, https: www. ec.senate.govpublic index.cfm about https: perma.cc 573E-HADE .69. The oint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction was created in 2011 todevelop a deficit reduction plan. Robert Pear Catherine Rampell, Lawmakers
in Both Parties Fear that ew Bud et Panel Will Erode Authority, N.Y. TIMES(Aug. 1, 2011),https: www.nytimes.com 2011 08 02 us politics 02panel.htmlhttps: perma.cc D 29- H8F .70. See .S. CONST. art. 1, 5.71. RICHARD S. ETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42929, PROCED RES FOR CONSIDERINGCHANGES IN SENATER LES 4 (2013).72. For example, the oint Committee on Taxation has a rotating chairperson. Seeoint Comm. onTaxation, verview, .S. CONGRESS, https: www. ct.gov about-us overview.html https: perma.cc 425 -TSRZ .73. Sessions of the Senate, .S. SENATE, https: www.senate.gov general FeaturesSessions.htm https: perma.cc L67G-4W68 .
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Congressional leaders must also determine how the Gang of EightCommittee will authori e subpoenas and or legal action by the committee.The procedure a congressional committee utili es to issue subpoenas isspecific to each committee.74 Here, the Committee should issue subpoenasonly when both the chair and vice-chair vote in favor of doing so.75 Thisstructure would only allow the Committee to subpoena individuals whenboth houses of Congress act in unison. The same structure could be used toauthori e legal action. y requiring the consent of both the House andSenate to subpoena witnesses or take legal action, the Committee will onlyact when it does so on behalf of Congress as an institution.Finally, Congress must amend the House and Senate Standing Rules toensure the Gang of Eight Committee can operate effectively. First,congressional leadersmust ensure that the Committee can protect sensitivenational security secrets. While House and Senate rules require mostcongressional committees to keep extensive records of committeedeliberations, they also provide HPSCI and SSCI with exemptions.76 Theseexemptions must be explicitly extended to the Gang of Eight. Additionally,Congress should amend the House and Senate Standing Rules to explicitlyauthori e the Committee to file suit on behalf of Congress. As Section II.C ofthis Note will argue, a congressional committee is far more likely to meet acourt’s standing analysis when both the House and Senate have authori edthe committee to file suit on behalf of Congress.Congress is capable of unilaterally creating the Gang of EightCommittee. ut in doing so, Congress must ensure that the House andSenate rules permit the Committee to conduct its work in an effective andsecret manner. Structuring the Committee with a rotating chair and vice-chair will promote its ultimate goal: acting on behalf of Congress as aninstitution.
74. Margaret Taylor, Con ressional Subpoena Power and E ecutive Privile e he
Comin Showdown Between the Branches, LAWFARE ( an. 30, 2019, 7:00 AM),https: www.lawfareblog.com congressional-subpoena-power-and-executive-privilege-coming-showdown-between-brancheshttps: perma.cc TC7Y-8H5G .75. Many Senate Committees require the chair and ranking member to vote infavor of the subpoena. MICHAEL L. OEMPEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44247, AS RVEY OFHO SE AND SENATECOMMITTEER LES ON S POENAS (2018).76. FREDERIC M. AISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20748, PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIEDINFORMATION Y CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 5 (2011).
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B. he Subpoena Power Will Be an Effective ool for Con ressional
LeadersThe Gang of Eight Committee could enhance the power of congressionalleaders vis- -vis the executive by enabling them to subpoena executivebranch officials when IC programs are unlawfully withheld from Congress.As detailed in Section I.C, under the status quo, the Gang of Eight cannoteffectively oversee or investigate IC programs withheld from thecongressional intelligence committees. With the subpoena power,congressional leaders could investigate any instance in which the presidentunlawfully withholds IC programs from Congress. This Section will providean overview of Congress’s subpoena power and then evaluate whether theGang of Eight could subpoena the president in light of the Supreme Court’srecent decision in rump v. Ma ars.77Courts have consistently upheld Congress’s authority to issue andenforce congressional subpoenas.78 At the same time, although t hecongressional power to obtain information is broad’ and indispensable,’the scope of Congress’s subpoena power is limited.79 ecause theConstitution does not expressly authori e congressional committees toconduct investigations, the subpoena power is ustified solely as anad unct to the legislative process.’ 80 As a result, a congressional subpoena
77. Trump v. Ma ars SA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).78. See Comm. on the udiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84 (D.D.C. 2008) ( Inshort, there can be no question that Congress has a right derived from itsArticle I legislative function to issue and enforce subpoenas, and acorresponding right to the information that is the sub ect of such subpoenas.Several Supreme Court decisions have confirmed that fact. ) see also Eastlandv. .S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 .S. 491 (1975) (finding that when acongressional subpoena falls within the sphere of legitimate legislativeactivity, the Constitution’s Speech and Debate Clause provides congressionalmembers immunity from udicial questioning) arenblatt v. nited States,360 .S. 109 (1959) (upholding a contempt of Congress conviction for failureto testify pursuant to a congressional subpoena). But see Watkins v. nitedStates, 354 .S. 178, 188, 198 (1957) (recogni ing that while individuals mustrespond to congressional subpoenas within the province of properinvestigation, subpoenas cannot be enforced if unrelated to any legislativepurpose ).79. Ma ars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031 (quotingWatkins, 354 .S. at 187).80. d. (quotingWatkins, 354 .S. at 197).
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is valid only if it is related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of theCongress.’ 81Congress may not issue subpoenas that are wholly unrelated to thelegislative process. For example, Congressmaynot issue a subpoena for thepurpose of law enforcement,’ because those powers are assigned underour Constitution to the Executive and the udiciary.’ 82 Furthermore, thereis no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure 83 andi nvestigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandi ement of theinvestigators or to punish’ those investigated are indefensible. 84The Gang of Eight Committee could issue subpoenas, as part of thelegislative process, if it learns that the president has unlawfully withheld anIC program from Congress. Congressional subpoenas must concern asub ect onwhich legislation could be had.’ 85 Congress has a vested interestin ensuring that the National Security Act functions as designed. A Gang ofEight Committee subpoena could buttress Congress’s ability to determinewhether to implement new statutory reporting requirements. Such asubpoenawould accordwith the legislative purpose of Congress’s subpoenapower.The Gang of Eight Committee could use both political pressure and theudiciary to enforce its subpoenas.86 The mere issuance of a subpoena canexert considerable political pressure on the president to comply.
81. d. (quotingWatkins, 354 .S. at 187).82. d. at 2032 (quoting uinn v. nited States, 349 .S. 155, 161 (1955)).83. Watkins, 354 .S. at 200.84. d. at 187.85. Eastland v. .S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 .S. 491, 506 (1975) (quotingMcGrain v. Daugherty, 273 .S. 135, 177 (1927)).86. The Gang of Eight could theoretically invoke other means to enforce theirsubpoenas. The long-dormant inherent contempt power allows Congress todetain and imprison a contemnor until the person complies with thesubpoena. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’SCONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL S POENAS: LAW,HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCED RE 10 (2017). The criminal contempt statuteallows Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch,thereby permitting the executive to pursue criminal charges against thecontemnor. d. at 1. Though the Gang of Eight Committee would be a ointcommittee, either house of Congress could vote to hold in contempt a witnesswho refuses to testify before the committee or provide documents soughtby the committee after being served with the congressional subpoena. d. at4.
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A recent HPSCI subpoena demonstrates how public subpoenas, relatedto classified matters, can effectively exert political pressure on thepresident. In September 2019, HPSCI Chairman Adam Schiff publiclysubpoenaed the Acting Director of National Intelligence as an ICwhistleblower complaint was unlawfully withheld from Congress.87 Thesubpoena power enabled HPSCI to publicly exert political pressure on thepresident, even though the underlying matter was classified. In thesubpoena’s aftermath, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi announced aformal impeachment inquiry of the president.88 While the HPSCI subpoenawas not the sole cause of Speaker Pelosi’s impeachment inquiry, t hedecisive event leading to impeachment had proved to be a whistle-blowercomplaint from a member of the intelligence community, the existence ofwhich was made public on September 13, when Schiff issued a subpoena toacting Director of National Intelligence oseph Maguire. 89 ltimately, theHouse used a public subpoena about a classified matter to effectively exertpolitical pressure on the president.The effectiveness of political pressure on the president explains why,historically, udicial intervention was rare in congressional subpoenas ofthe executive branch. These disputes, better understood as political battleswith legal underpinnings, were typically ad udicated in negotiations
87. Press Release, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, House ofRepresentatives, Chairman Schiff Issues Subpoena for WhistleblowerComplaint eing nlawfully Withheld by Acting DNI from IntelligenceCommittees, (Sept. 13, 2019), https: intelligence.house.gov newsdocumentsingle.aspx DocumentID 688 https: perma.cc C4LL-D G .88. Nicholas Fandos, ancy Pelosi Announces Formal mpeachment n uiry of
rump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2019 09 24us politics democrats-impeachment-trump.html https: perma.cc GM7A-D L4 .89. ason Zengerle, nside Adam Schiff s mpeachment Game Plan, N.Y. TIMES. MAG.(Nov. 5, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2019 11 05 maga ine adam-schiff-impeachment.html https: perma.cc DZ2F-5TSE see also AndrewDesiderio yle Cheney, rump emesis Adam Schiff Holds the Keys to His
mpeachment, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2019), https: www.politico.comstory 2019 09 24 adam-schiff-trump-impeachment-1509833https: perma.cc E3GP- ZCH ( Rep. Adam Schiff . . . is driving a narrativethat could lead to Trump’s impeachment . . . . It was Schiff who issued asubpoena and secured testimony from the intelligence community’s topwatchdog, who confirmed he had been blocked from providing details toCongress, in apparent violation of the law. ).
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between Congress and the president with each side making politicalcalculations about what fights are worth having. 90On the other hand, the modern Congress has sought udicialenforcement of congressional subpoenas. President Trump vow ed tofight every congressional subpoena, departing from previous presidentsconfront ing congressional oversight investigations run by theiradversaries. 91 As a result, the House of Representatives began going tocourt against the president at a tempo never seen before. 92 The Courtrecogni ed the shift in enforcement strategy, noting that Ma arsrepresents a significant departure from historical practice as previously,the Supreme Court had never considered a dispute over a congressionalsubpoena for the President’s records. 93If Congress and the president cannot maintain their tradition ofnegotiation and compromise regarding congressional subpoenas, the Gangof Eight Committee may seek udicial enforcement of its subpoena.94 Thetarget of the subpoena will affect the legal analysis applied by a court.ecause of the unique position’ of the President, a court will only enforcea congressional subpoena against the president if it comports with theSupreme Court’s four-part balancing test established in Ma ars.95 Courtsevaluating congressional subpoenas of the president must assess thefollowing factors.1. The asserted legislative purpose should warrant thesignificant step of involving the President and his papers. 96 Critically,the Court noted that Congress may not rely on the President’s
90. Taylor, supra note 74.91. Charlie Savage, rump ows Stonewall of All House Subpoenas, Settin p
Fi ht over Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com2019 04 24 us politics donald-trump-subpoenas.htmlhttps: perma.cc H 86- VZ8 .92. Charlie Savage Nicholas Fandos, he House v. rump Stymied Lawmakers
ncreasin ly Battle in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019),https: www.nytimes.com 2019 08 13 us politics trump-house-lawsuits.html https: perma.cc VLV6-VLW5 .93. Trump v. Ma ars SA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020).94. d.95. d. at 2035 (quoting Clinton v. ones, 520 .S. 681, 698 (1997)).96. d.
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information if other sources could reasonably provide Congress theinformation it needs in light of its particular legislative ob ective. 972. The subpoena must be no broader than reasonably necessary tosupport Congress’s legislative ob ective. 983. Congress should have strong evidence to establish that asubpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. 994. Finally, courts should be careful to assess the burdens imposed onthe President by a subpoena. 100This Note cannot predict precisely how lower courts will implement the
Ma ars balancing test there is simply no case law yet. Nevertheless,
Ma ars reaffirms Congress’s ability to subpoena executive branch officialsand the president himself.Although the udiciary provides Congress with a powerful enforcementmechanism, udicial enforcement can be a lengthy process. For example, in2012, Attorney General Eric Holder failed to comply with a House Oversightand Government Reform Committee subpoena.101 President Obamainvoked executive privilege and ordered the Attorney General not to turnover the subpoenaed documents. The committee filed suit, authori ed by aHouse resolution, seeking udicial enforcement of the subpoena.102Not until2016, after a newCongress and a newAttorney General, did the D.C. DistrictCourt issue its opinion in Committee on versi ht and Government Reform v.
Lynch103 requiring the new Attorney General to comply with the 2012subpoena.Critics of the Gang of Eight Committee may argue that the efficacy ofcongressional subpoenas against the executive branch is stymied by the
97. d. at 2035-36.98. d. at 2036.99. d.100. d.101. See onathanWeisman Charlie Savage, House Finds Holder in Contempt ver
n uiry on Guns, N.Y. TIMES ( une 28, 2012) https: www.nytimes.com 201206 29 us politics fast-and-furious-holder-contempt-citation-battle.htmlhttps: perma.cc H 34-43 2 .102. Comm. on Oversight Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2013).103. 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 115 (D.D.C. 2016).
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slow pace of udicial enforcement.104 However, critics should not dismissthe importance of the subpoena power simply because udicial enforcementis slow. Congress has historically been successful in using political pressure,rather than the udiciary, to enforce its subpoenas. Furthermore, themodern Congress appears to be exploring creative ways to enforceCongress’s subpoena power. For example, HPSCI Chairman Adam Schiff hasconsidered reviving the inherent contempt power to fine executive branchofficials who refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas.105 Congresshas demonstrated that it is unwilling to rely solely on the udiciary forsubpoena enforcement. Congressional leaders can similarly seek aggressiveenforcement of their subpoenas.Congress will greatly increase its oversight of the IC by empowering theGang of Eight to issue subpoenas. Congressional leaders are currentlypowerless to oversee IC programs that the president withholds fromCongress. With the subpoena power, congressional leaders will finally beempowered to exert political pressure on a president who withholds ICprograms from Congress.
C. Gan of Ei ht Lawsuits Will Meet a Court s Standin Analysisnder this Note’s proposed structure, the Gang of Eight may file suit onbehalf of Congress either to enforce a subpoena or to require the presidentto disclose a non-covert intelligence program to the intelligencecommittees. Courts have consistently upheld Congress’s ability to enforcecongressional subpoenas through the udiciary.106 However, it remains an
104. See enerally Charlie Savage, he Subpoena and Contempt Fi ht Between
rump and Con ress, E plained, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019) ( The strategy ofunabashedly stonewalling Democrats’ oversight investigations raises thequestion of what lawmakers can do about it and whether, even if theyultimately prevail, the court fight will take so long that the Trump team willrun out the clock before the next election. ), https: www.nytimes.com2019 05 02 us politics subpoenas-trump-congress.htmlhttps: perma.cc HSD2-E8F8 .105. Morgan Chalfant, Schiff Says Con ress Wei hin Hefty Fines for rump fficials
Who Evade Subpoenas, HILL (May 10, 2019),https: thehill.com policy national-security 443081-schiff-says-congress-contemplating-hefty-fines-for-trump-officials https: perma.cc R7W -C8E .106. See supra Section II. see also Comm. on the udiciary, .S. House ofRepresentatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that
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open question whether Congress could successfully file suit against apresident who unlawfully withholds a non-covert IC program fromCongress. Such a suit would likely be challenged on the basis of standing.Whether Congress has standing to sue the president is a live andongoing debate. Many articles already provide an effective survey ofcongressional standing urisprudence.107 This Section argues that when thepresident unlawfully withholds an IC program from Congress, Congresssuffers an institutional in ury which can be litigated through a lawsuit filedon behalf of both houses of Congress.1. A rief Overview of Congressional StandingArticle III of the Constitution provides federal courts with urisdictiononly when a dispute is a case or controversy. 108 As the Supreme Courthas noted, This is a bedrock requirement.’ 109 Failure to meet it is fatal tolitigation.110 The Court clearly explained its current standing doctrine in
Friends of the Earth, nc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services C , nc.111There, the court held:T o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff mustshow (1) it has suffered an in ury in fact that is (a) concrete andparticulari ed and (b) actual or imminent, not con ectural orhypothetical (2) the in ury is fairly traceable to the challengedaction of the defendant and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
Congress’s subpoena power involves a basic udicial task subpoenaenforcement with which federal courts are very familiar ).107. See, e. ., ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43712, ARTICLE III STANDINGANDCONGRESSIONALS ITSAGAINSTTHEE EC TIVE RANCH (2014) Vicki C. ackson,
Con ressional Standin to Sue he Role of Courts and Con ress in .S.
Constitutional Democracy, 93 IND. L. . 845 (2018).108. .S. CONST. art. III, 2.109. Raines v. yrd, 521 .S. 811, 818 (1997) (citation omitted).110. See, e. ., Allen v. Wright, 468 .S. 737, 750 (1984), abro ated on other rounds
by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 .S. 118 (2014)( The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have standing’ to invoke thepower of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrineslimiting the federal udicial power . ).111. 528 .S. 167 (2000).
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speculative, that the in ury will be redressed by a favorabledecision.112As applied to congressional litigants, the doctrine of standing has generallybeen invoked only in cases challenging executive branch actions or acts ofCongress and has focused on the in ury prong of standing. 113 Casesinvolving congressional plaintiffs can be broken down into two broadcategories: (1) cases in which individual members of Congress file suit and(2) cases in which Congress as an institution (either as a house orcommittee) files suit.114Individual congressional members can only sue the executive undernarrow circumstances because individual members lack standing to assertthe institutional interests of a legislature. 115 Claims by individual membersof Congress of in uries that affect all members of Congress in the samebroad and undifferentiated manner have been held insufficientlypersonal’ or particulari ed’ to meet Article III’s concretenessrequirement.116 Such in uries are institutional and require that Congress,or an appropriately authori ed agent, files suit.117The Supreme Court has recently emphasi ed that, when a bicamerallegislature suffers an institutional in ury, both houses of the legislaturemust file suit together to meet a court’s standing analysis. In 2015, theSupreme Court found that the Ari ona legislature had standing to sue overa ballot initiative that gave redistricting authority to an independentcommission. Important to the Court’s standing analysis was the fact that theAri ona Legislature was an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutionalin ury, and it commenced this action after authori ing votes in both of its
chambers. 118TheCourt reinforced this point in ir iniaHouse of Dele ates v. Bethune
Hill.119 It held that the Virginia House of Delegates did not have standing in
112. Laidlaw, 528 .S. at 180-81 (citing Lu an v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 .S. 555,560-61 (1992)).113. DOLAN, supra note 107, at 2.114. d. at 1.115. Va. House of Delegates v. ethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953-54 (2019).116. ucinich v. ush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2002).117. d.118. Ari . State Legislature v. Ari . Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,2664 (2015) (emphasis added).119. Bethune Hill, 139 S. Ct. at 1953-54.
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part because a single House of a bicameral legislature lacks capacity toassert interests belonging to the legislature as a whole. 120 Bethune Hillmakes it highly unlikely that, under the status quo, either HPSCI or SSCI cansue the president for withholding an IC program from Congress, as neitheris authori ed to speak on behalf of Congress.2. When the President Withholds an IC Program, CongressSuffers an Institutional In ury that Cannot e RemediedThrough the Legislative ProcessCongress suffers an institutional in ury when the president unlawfullywithholds an IC program from Congress. This is true even when onlymembers of HPSCI and SSCI, but not every member of Congress, wereentitled to the information.In Cummin s v. Murphy,121 seventeen members of the House OversightCommittee alleged that the General Services Administration (GSA) hadunlawfully withheld information regarding GSA’s lease agreement withTrump Old Post Office LLC. The court held that the in ury suffered bycommittee members was institutional because it was rooted in a rightgranted to them as Members of Congress. 122 Even though the deprivationof the right to information was not necessarily shared equally’ by everymember of the Committee, let alone every M ember,’ 123 the in ury couldnot be considered personal because the plaintiffs had not been deprived ofsomething to which they personally are entitled. 124 Similarly, when thepresident withholds an IC program from the congressional intelligencecommittees, Congress suffers an institutional in ury.Congress can only file suit to remedy an institutional in ury if it cannotremedy the alleged harm through the legislative process.125 Critics of thisNote’s proposal may argue that either the Constitution’s Speech and Debate
120. d.121. Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 97-99 (D.D.C. 2018).122. d. at 108.123. d.124. d. at 109.125. lumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 2018), rev d on other
rounds, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ( D.C. Circuit precedent teaches thatindividual Members of Congress do not have standing to sue the Executiveranch when their institutional in ury is such that they can obtain theirremedy in Congress. ).
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Clause126 or the appropriations process could provide Congress with alegislative remedy. Neither of these processes are adequate. Therefore,Congress should be permitted to seek udicial redress.Some have argued that the Speech and Debate Clause permits anymember of Congress to disclose classified information on the floor of theHouse or Senate.127 In theory, this could allow congressional leaders todisclose unlawfully withheld IC programs to Congress. However, whilemembers of Congress may be protected from legal consequences, they candefinitely be punished by Congress if they violate a rule. 128 The House(under House Rule (11)(g)) and the Senate (under Senate Resolution 400)have explicit rules regarding how classified information can be releasedover the president’s ob ection. The Constitution permits the House and theSenate to determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its members fordisorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel amember. 129 Congressional leaders could face punishment if they were toinvoke the Speech and Debate Clause. Therefore, they are unable to discloseIC programs unlawfully withheld from the intelligence committees withoutfear of reprimand. The Speech andDebate Clause does not provide a remedythrough the legislative process.Alternatively, critics may argue that Congress’s appropriations poweralways provides it with a legislativemeans of controlling the executive. Thisargument is unpersuasive. HPSCI and SSCI cannot regulate the IC throughthe intelligence appropriations process if they are wholly unaware of an ICprogram. Even if the Gang of Eight is briefed on a program, its memberscannot effectively argue for changes in IC appropriations withoutunlawfully disclosing the IC program itself. Permitting congressionalleaders to seek vague limits within an appropriations bill does not amountto a legislative remedy.When the president withholds an IC program from the congressionalintelligence committees, Congress suffers an institutional in ury that cannot
126. .S. CONST. art I, 6, cl. 6.127. See, e. ., ruce Ackerman, Breach or Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 1, 2013),https: foreignpolicy.com 2013 08 01 breach-or-debatehttps: perma.cc WC3 -Z7FS .128. el McClanahan, rump s Ability to Classify Mueller Report s Greater hreat
han E ecutive Privile e, ST SEC RITY (Sept. 17, 2018),https: www. ustsecurity.org 60751 trump-claiming-executive-privilege-hide-mueller-report-real-threat-classification-is https: perma.cc R5N3-V4CG .129. .S. CONST. art. I, 5.
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be remedied through the legislative process. nder the status quo, neitherHPSCI, SSCI, nor the Gang of Eight can file suit on behalf of Congress. TheGang of Eight Committee would empower congressional leaders tosuccessfully file suit when the president withholds an IC program fromCongress.3. The Gang of Eight Committee Is the Vehicle Most Likely toMeet a Court’s Standing AnalysisGang of Eight lawsuits could reassert Congress’s role in overseeing theIC. To succeed, these lawsuits must prove they are constitutionallysupported, prudentially practical, and effectuate actual change. Many casessupport the notion that when legislatures file suit as institutionalplaintiff s asserting an institutional in ury, they meet Article III’s in ury-in-fact requirement.130 In nited States v. A & ,131 the D.C. Circuit permittedthe chairman of a congressional committee, who was authori ed to file suiton behalf of Congress, to file suit as the House as a whole has standing toassert its investigatory power. 132 Courts have frequently applied thereasoning underlying A & to permit congressional lawsuits made onbehalf of Congress against the executive.133eyond the requirements of constitutional standing, courts considerthe prudential’ concern of unnecessarily intruding on an inter-branchpolitical dispute. 134This further limitation is founded in concern about theproper and properly limited role of the courts in a democratic
130. See, e. ., Ari . State Legislature v. Ari . Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.2652, 2664 (2015).131. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).132. d. at 391 (emphasis added).133. See, e. ., Comm. on Oversight Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21(D.D.C. 2013) (holding that a House committee had standing to enforce asubpoena because the action was a suit specifically authori ed by alegislative body to redress a clearly delineated, concrete in ury to theinstitution ) Comm. on the udiciary, .S. House of Representatives v. Miers,558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 70 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that a committee dulyauthori ed by the House had standing to enforce a subpoena and that theCourt has never held that an institution, such as the House of Representatives,cannot file suit to address an institutional harm ).134. Adam L. lank, Raines v. yrd: A Death Knell for the Con ressional Suit, 49MERCER L. REV. 609, 613 (1998).
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society. 135 As the Court has noted, the law of Art icle III standing is builton a single basic idea the idea of separation of powers. 136 In determiningwhether Gang of Eight lawsuits are prudentially supported, courts willlikely consider whether the actions were authori ed by Congress, Congressretains other legislative tools to rectify the claimed in ury, and the lawsuitsare historically supported. Gang of Eight lawsuits will not be barred basedon any of these analyses.In amending the House and Senate’s standing rules to create the Gangof Eight Committee, it is critical that both houses of Congress explicitlyauthori e the Gang of Eight to file suit on behalf of Congress. C ourts havefound congressional authori ation to be the key’ distinguishing factormoving a case to the permissible category of an institutional plaintiffasserting an institutional in ury. 137 y explicitly authori ing the Committeeto file suit, Congress will assuage courts’ concern that eight members areembroiling all of Congress in an inter-branch disputewithout authori ation.Courts may be hesitant to permit lawsuits when Congress retains otherlegislative tools to address the claimed in ury. D.C. Circuit precedentindicates that members of Congress do not have standing to sue theExecutive ranchwhen their institutional in ury is such that they can obtaintheir remedy in Congress. 138 Congress exerts most of its influence over theIC through the intelligence appropriations process. oth HPSCI and SSCI
135. ennett v. Spear, 520 .S. 154, 162 (1997) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 .S.490, 498 (1975)) see also lank, supra note 134, at 617 ( In cases involving adeparture from mandatory procedure, the plaintiff might have constitutionalstanding per se but still fail for prudential’ reasons if the reviewing courtdetermined that ad udication would unnecessarily encroach upon an inter-branch political dispute. ).136. Allen v. Wright, 468 .S. 737, 752 (1984).137. Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 106 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Miers,558 F. Supp. 2d at 71) see also Raines v. yrd, 521 .S. 811, 829 (1997)(dismissing a congressional suit and noting that w e attach someimportance to the fact that appellees have not been authori ed to representtheir respective Houses of Congress in this action ).138. lumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 2018) rev d on other
rounds, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The District Court for the District ofColumbia recently dismissed a congressional lawsuit against the Trumpadministration inwhich the court found importance in the fact that theHouseretains the institutional tools necessary to remedy any harm caused to thispower by the Administration’s actions. .S. House of Representatives v.Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2019).
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use their fiscal control to obtain the intelligence agencies’ compliancewhennecessary, 139 and Congress still views the appropriations process as oneof its most important forms of oversight. 140 This right is completelyabrogated when the president withholds IC programs from the intelligencecommittees. If Congress lacks any ability to exert influence over the ICthrough the appropriations process, litigationmay provide the onlymeansfor Congress to vindicate its constitutional role. 141Courts have also frequently looked at historical practice to determinewhether to permit a congressional lawsuit. In other words, if Congresstypically resolves an issue through the political process, courts may behesitant to permit a congressional lawsuit.142 Gang of Eight lawsuits protectCongress’s investigatory powers. Though Gang of Eight lawsuits are,naturally, a novel invention, Congress’s ability to protect its investigatorypowers through the udiciary is historically supported.The Founding Generation understood that Congress’s investigatorypowers were important. President Washington and his cabinet knew thatthe House could conduct an inquest, institute inquiries, and call forpapers. 143 In 1927, the Supreme Court found that a legislative body cannotlegislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting theconditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. 144 Decadeslater, the Court asserted that Congress’s investigatory power is inherent in
139. ames S. Van Wagenen, A Review of Con ressional versi ht Critics and
Defenders, CIA (Apr. 14, 2007), https: www.cia.gov library center-for-the-study-of-intelligence kent-csi vol40no5 pdf v40i5a11p.pdfhttps: perma.cc DVN6-8 SP .140. Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Con ressional versi ht,98 MAR . L. REV. 881, 938 (2014).141. Mc aye Neumeister, Note, Revivin the Power of the Purse Appropriations
Clause Liti ation and ational Security Law, 127 YALE L. . 2512, 2549 (2018).142. InMnuchin, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a lawsuitbrought by the House of Representatives alleging that President Trump wasmisappropriating funds for a border wall. In its dismissal, the court found thelack of historical examples telling . . . . The House thus lack s support fromprecedent,’ and historical practice appears to cut against it as well.’
Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (quoting Raines v. yrd, 521 .S. 811, 826(1997)).143. Tara Leigh Grove Neal Devins, Con ress s Limited Power to Represent tself
in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 598-99 (2014).144. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 .S. 135, 175 (1927).
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the legislative process and is broad. 145 As the District Court for theDistrict of Columbia recently noted, the House’s power to investigate hasbeen enforced with periodic help from federal courts. 146 In litigating Gangof Eight lawsuits, Congress should be mindful to reinforce their historicalbasis.Gang of Eight lawsuits do not seek to declare intelligence programsunlawful they simply ask courts to require the president to keep Congressinformed so that it can conduct its investigatory and oversight roles. Theselawsuits are likely to meet a court’s standing analysis as they will permitcongressional leaders to file suit on behalf of both houses of Congress whenCongress suffers an institutional in ury. Gang of Eight lawsuits arehistorically supported and comport with the Court’s modern legislativestanding urisprudence.PART III: CO NTERARG MENTS RESPONSESCongressional lawsuits against the executive are no panacea forimproving congressional oversight. This Part acknowledges and addressesmany of the counterarguments that this Note’s proposal must address.efore enacting any structural changes to the Gang of Eight, Congress mustconsider the practicality of the committee and evaluate how the presidentwill respond to its creation.
A. he Gan of Ei ht Committee s Politically FeasibleThis Note cannot guarantee that the Gang of Eight Committee will beenacted by Congress. Nearly any proposed reformation of Congress’soversight of the IC will face political pushback. As Professor AlanAbramowit explains, it’s very hard to get past the partisan dividebecause Democrats and Republicans have such different perspectives oncongressional oversight.147 Nevertheless, Congress should pursue thisNote’s proposal. Security experts have observed that the election ofPresident iden, who hails from a different political party than the outgoingadministration, offers an opportunity for systematic reevaluation of
145. Watkins v. nited States, 354 .S. 178, 187 (1957).146. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 17.147. Susan Milligan, Drownin in Bitter Partisanship, .S. NEWS WORLDREP. ( une23, 2017), https: www.usnews.com news the-report articles 2017-06-23partisanship-drowns-out-bipartisan-oversight https: perma.cc D V8-68TL .
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national security matters. 148 The Gang of Eight Committee would be lesspolitically costly to legislators than previous efforts to reform the NationalSecurity Act. Furthermore, in the wake of the Trump administration and ina new era of divided government, the Gang of Eight Committee may findsupport from both Democrat and Republican lawmakers. Congress mayadopt the Gang of Eight Committee as a response to President Trump’squest to impede congressional oversight and limit legislative standing.Additionally, the Gang of Eight Committee will improve congressionaloversight of the iden administration’s handling of the IC.Individual members of Congress are incentivi ed to act in whatevermanner will support their reelection.149 nfortunately, electoral incentivesdiscourage members of Congress from expending significant politicalcapital on intelligence issues. Congressional members’ focus on reelectionsteers them to focus on domestic policy issues, which offer greater politicalbenefits and lower political costs than intelligence oversight.150Compared to other reforms, such as amending the statutory language ofthe National Security Act, the Gang of Eight Committee is less politicallycostly because it does not require Congress to navigate the president’s vetopower. Presidential vetoes are a powerful deterrent against congressionalaction because Congress overturns presidential vetoes less than fivepercent of the time.151 In Section I.D, this Note demonstrated howPresidents ush and Obama successfully used the threat of the veto powerto prevent amendments to the National Security Act. ut Congress retains
148. David ris,What Hard ational Security ChoicesWould a Biden Administration
Face , LAWFARE (May 27, 2020, 9:31 AM),https: www.lawfareblog.com what-hard-national-security-choices-would-biden-administration-face https: perma.cc V5M -WG Z .149. David Mayhew argues that members of Congress are single-minded seekersof reelection. DAVIDR.MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (2d ed.2004).150. Amy . Zegart, he Roots of Weak Con ressional ntelli ence versi ht, HOOVERINST. 6 (2011), https: www.hoover.org sites defaultfiles research docs future-challenges- egart.pdf https: perma.cc LW3N-5YS .151. See Andrew Glass, For the First ime, Con ress verrides a Presidential eto,
March , , POLITICO (Mar. 3, 2019), https: www.politico.com story2019 03 03 this-day-in-politics-march-3-1845-1196996https: perma.cc NF79-4G6C see also Rebecca E. Deen Laura W. Arnold,
eto hreats as a Policy ool When to hreaten , 32 PRESIDENTIAL ST D. . 30,30 (2002) ( One of the most powerful tools of the President in the policy-making process is the veto. ).
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plenary power over its standing rules, so the president cannot veto the Gangof Eight Committee. This makes the Committee a particularly attractiveoption for members of Congress who are uninterested in expendingsignificant time and political capital on IC oversight.President Trump’s efforts to impair congressional oversight and limitlegislative standingmay increase congressional support of the Gang of EightCommittee. President Trump filed suit to block a House Oversight andReform Committee Subpoena,152 filed suit to prevent HPSCI and the HouseFinancial Services Committee from subpoenaing Deutsche ank and CapitalOne,153 and filed suit against theHouseWays andMeans Committee to blockdisclosure of his tax returns.154 In response, House Democrats introducedlegislation that would, among other reforms, require courts to expeditelitigation when the president refuses to comport with a congressionalsubpoena.155 Congress has responded to the Trump Administration’sattempts to impair congressional oversight by developing innovativemethods to protect Congress’s investigatory power. The Gang of Eightcommittee is yet another viable alternative for a Congress eager to protectits oversight power.Furthermore, through enacting the Gang of Eight Committee, Congresscan respond to the Trump administration’s attempts to narrow legislativestanding. In ir inia House of Dele ates v. Bethune Hill,156 the nited Statesfiled an amicus brief arguing that a legislature asserts a cogni able
152. Andrew Desiderio, rump Sues to Block House Subpoena of Financial Records,POLITICO (Apr. 22, 2019), https: www.politico.com story 2019 04 22 trump-sues-oversight-committee-chairman-finance-records-1284995https: perma.cc N 5R-D7S7 .153. Maggie Haberman,William . Rashbaum David Enrich, rump Sues Deutsche
Bank and Capital ne to Block Compliance with Subpoenas, N.Y.TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2019 04 29 us politics trump-lawsuit-deutsche-bank.html https: perma.cc E32 -5VL3 .154. Hadley aker, rump Files Suit A ainst House Ways and Means Committee and
ew York State fficials, LAWFARE ( uly 23, 2019, 4:13 PM),https: www.lawfareblog.com trump-files-suit-against-house-ways-and-means-committee-and-new-york-state-officials https: perma.cc 2A 9-G P .155. See Nicholas Fandos,With Proposal to Curb Presidential Power, Democrats Eye
an Era After rump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020), https: www.nytimes.com2020 09 23 us politics democrats-government-overhaul-trump.htmlhttps: perma.cc 98H-28VZ .156. 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
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institutional in ury only in rare circumstances. 157 In its brief, the Trumpadministration acknowledged that it was concerned that, if the Court wereto find the Virginia House had standing, it would open the door to anynumber of lawsuits by state legislative bodies and the Houses of Congress.The Trump administration’s willingness to involve itself in state legislativestanding issues is symptomatic of the administration’s general concernabout legislative standing. Gang of Eight lawsuits are a natural and effectiveresponse to a president who seeks to limit legislative standing.Some Republican lawmakersmay be unlikely to support a proposal thatis seen as merely a response to President Trump. President Trump hashistorically retained significant popularity within the Republican Party158and Republican members of Congress may be concerned that they will facea primary challenger if they are seen as disloyal to him.159 ut aftersupporters of President Trump stormed the .S. Capitol,160 Republicanpoliticians have begun to distance themselves from President Trump.161
157. rief for the nited States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 8,Va. House of Delegates v. ethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) (No. 18-281),2019WL 130276.158. See, e. ., Amina Dunn, rump s Approval Ratin s So Far Are nusually Stable
and Deeply Partisan, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2020),https: www.pewresearch.org fact-tank 2020 08 24 trumps-approval-ratings-so-far-are-unusually-stable-and-deeply-partisanhttps: perma.cc 7MF -65ER .159. See, e. ., Sergio Martine - eltran, Senate Race Candidates Fi ht to Show
Loyalty to rump at ennessee s Primary, NAT’L P . RADIO (Aug. 5, 2020),https: www.npr.org 2020 08 05 899230745 senate-race-candidates-fight-to-show-loyalty-to-trump-at-tennessees-primaryhttps: perma.cc R 9V-YALN .160. See Rebecca Tan et al., rump Supporters Storm .S. Capitol, with ne Woman
Killed and ear Gas Fired, WASH. POST ( an. 6, 2021)https: www.washingtonpost.com local trump-supporters-storm-capitol-dc 2021 01 06 58afc0b8-504b-11eb-83e3-322644d82356 story.htmlhttps: perma.cc T V9-L A .161. Senator Mitt Romney described this event as an insurrection incited byPresident Trump. See Press Release, Sen. Mitt Romney, Romney CondemnsInsurrection at .S. Capitol ( an. 6, 2021),https: www.romney.senate.gov romney-condemns-insurrection-us-capitolhttps: perma.cc W93A-2Y64 . North Carolina Republican Senator Richardurr stated that President Trump bears responsibility for today’s events bypromoting the unfounded conspiracy theories that have led to this point. SeePress Release, Sen. Richard urr, Senator urr Statement on CongressionalVote to Certify the 2020 Presidential Election ( an. 6, 2021),
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Moreover, the election of President iden162may encourage Republicanlegislators to support the Gang of Eight Committee. Republican lawmakershave demonstrated their interest in investigating any alleged if factuallydubious misconduct by President iden.163 Republican lawmakers cancommit to effective oversight of the incoming iden administration byadopting this Note’s proposal.nder Presidents ush and Obama, Congress unsuccessfully sought toamend the National Security Act to increase congressional oversight of theIC. Congress should consider reform efforts that are not susceptible to thepresident’s veto power. ltimately, when compared to other proposals toreformcongressional oversight, such as amending theNational Security Act,this Note’s proposalwould be less politically costly, allowCongress to better
https: www.burr.senate.gov press releases senator-burr-statement-on-congressional-vote-to-certify-the-2020-presidential-electionhttps: perma.cc RMC6- R3V . And Nebraska Republican Senator enSasse stated that the .S. Capitol was ransacked while the leader of the freeworld cowered behind his keyboard tweeting against his vice president forfulfilling the duties of his oath to the Constitution. Colby Itkowit PaulinaFiro i, Democrats, Republicans Blame rump for ncitin Coup as Mob Storms
Capitol, WASH. POST ( an. 6, 2021)https: www.washingtonpost.com politics 2021 01 06 democrats-republicans-reaction-trump https: perma.cc 6AER- 3H . ut see arenYourish et al., Which Members of Con ress b ected to Certifyin Biden s
ictory , N.Y. TIMES ( an. 7, 2021),https: www.nytimes.com interactive 2021 01 07 us elections electoral-college-biden-ob ectors.html https: perma.cc 4Z - C (listing theRepublican lawmakers who voted to sustain ob ections to certifying theresults of the 2020 presidential election).162. onathan Martin Alexander urns, Biden Wins Presidency, Endin Four
umultuous Years nder rump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020),https: www.nytimes.com 2020 11 07 us politics biden-election.htmlhttps: perma.cc W 8 -2M W .163. Senate Republicans have already investigated corruption allegations againstPresident iden and his son. SeeNicholas Fandos, Republican n uiry Finds o
Evidence of Wron doin by Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020),https: www.nytimes.com 2020 09 23 us politics biden-inquiry-republicans- ohnson.html https: perma.cc T 2T-ANFR . And in theaftermath of the 2020 presidential elections, GOP senators . . . discuss edprobes into the 2020 election. Lauren Fox eremy Herb, After Biden Win,
G P Eyes nvesti ations into the Election, CNN (Nov. 10, 2020),https: www.cnn.com 2020 11 10 politics republican-congress-investigation-senate index.html https: perma.cc 5P N-SD R .
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oversee the IC, and is a natural response for Congress to protect itsinstitutional interests.
B. Con ressional Leaders Will Learn When the President nlawfully
Withholds C Pro rams from Con ressThe Gang of Eight cannot issue subpoenas nor file lawsuits ifcongressional leaders are wholly unaware that an IC program that has beenunlawfully withheld from Congress. Some critics may question whethercongressional leaders will knowwhether the president is withholding an ICprogram. Due to leaks and formal whistleblower complaints, it is highlyunlikely that a president could permanently withhold an IC program fromCongress.Whistleblowers during the ush, Obama, and Trump administrationsinhibited the executive’s efforts to withhold IC programs from Congress. In2002, President ush approved the NSA’s mass surveillance of calls and e-mails of personswithin the nited Stateswithout court-approvedwarrants.Contrary to his statutory obligations, President ush did not inform thecongressional intelligence committees. In December 2005, after sitting onthe story for thirteen months,164 the ew York imes revealed the NSA’sprogram due to a whistleblower from within the IC.165During President Obama’s administration, Chelsea Manning, an Armyintelligence analyst, provided hundreds of thousands of classifiedintelligence-related documents to WikiLeaks in 2010.166 And in une 2013,the Guardian revealed that, under President Obama, the NSA was secretlycollecting the telephone records of millions of American customers of
164. Eric Lichtblau, he Education of a Reporter he nside Drama Behind the
imes Warrantless Wiretappin Story, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2008, 7:08 PM),https: slate.com news-and-politics 2008 03 the-inside-drama-behind-the-warrantless-wiretapping-story.html https: perma.cc TR4 -ZRM9 .165. ames Risen Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets .S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), https: www.nytimes.com 2005 12 16politics bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.htmlhttps: perma.cc A7T9-7 WS .166. Thom Shanker, Loophole May Have Aided heft of Classified Data, N.Y. TIMES( uly 8, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2010 07 09 world09breach.html https: perma.cc NY 2-VH95 .
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Veri on.167 Edward Snowden, a former systems analyst at the CIA, leakedthe NSA’s program.168Most recently, in September 2019, a CIA officer stationed at the WhiteHouse filed a formal whistleblowing complaint, alleging that PresidentTrump urged the krainian president to investigate former Vice Presidentoe iden.169 That this complaint was provided to Congress and eventuallymade public demonstrates that formal whistleblower complaints aretreated seriously within the IC. As Acting Director of National Intelligenceoseph Maguire stated, We must protect those who demonstrate thecourage to report alleged wrongdoing, whether on the battlefield or in theworkplace. 170Leaks and whistleblowers make it difficult for the president toeffectively hide an IC program in perpetuity. This is important in assessingboth the effectiveness of the Gang of Eight Committee and in consideringhow the president might respond to its creation. Some critics may questionwhether the president could retaliate against Congress by withholding allcovert and non-covert IC operations from Congress, but leaks andwhistleblower complaints minimi e the risk that the president will pursuestrategy. ltimately, congressional leaders will likely eventually learn of anIC program, even if the president attempts to withhold it from Congress,because of leaks and whistleblower complaints.
167. Glenn Greenwald, SA Collectin Phone Records of Millions of eri on
Customers Daily, G ARDIAN ( un. 6, 2013), https: www.theguardian.comworld 2013 un 06 nsa-phone-records-veri on-court-orderhttps: perma.cc 5SLF-Z6F6 .168. Profile Edward Snowden, C (Dec. 16, 2013), https: www.bbc.comnews world-us-canada-22837100 https: perma.cc A R3-3 4Z .169. Michael D. Shear, White House ried to Lock Down kraine Call Records,
Whistle Blower Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com2019 09 26 us politics whistleblower-complaint-released.htmlhttps: perma.cc T4AH-R6N .170. ulian E. arnes et al., White House Knew of Whistle Blower s Alle ations Soon
After rump s Call with kraine Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019),https: www.nytimes.com 2019 09 26 us politics who-is-whistleblower.html https: perma.cc 8S9 - CGS .
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C. Courts Will ot Simply Defer to the E ecutive When Ad udicatin
Gan of Ei ht LawsuitsCourts are highly deferential to the executive branch on issues ofnational security.171 History demonstrates that when members of Congresssue the president over a national security issue, the suits are oftendismissed on procedural grounds.172 Critics of Gang of Eight lawsuits mayallege that courts will simply defer to the executive because the lawsuitspertain to national security matters.This argument is not unfounded. Many udges believe that wartime,emergencies, or national security matters require udges to afford anadditional degree of deference to the executive branch. 173 Some udgeshave been persuaded by the argument that electorally accountablebranches of government ought to make national security decisions.174Others have argued that in exigent circumstances decisions relating tonational securitymust bemade quickly and the president ought to have therequisite flexibility to make decisions to protect the nation.175
171. See W. Neil Eggleston Amanda Elbogen, he Supreme Court Should Rethink
Deference to the E ecutive in the ravel Ban Case, ST SEC RITY (Apr. 19,2018), https: www. ustsecurity.org 55059 supreme-court-rethink-deference-executive-travel-ban-case https: perma.cc 2F98-ET T ( Courtsordinarily defer to the udgments of the Executive ranch in areas of nationalsecurity and foreign policy, and rightly so. ).172. See, e. ., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 .S. 996 (1979) (After granting cert on thischallenge to President Carter’s nullification of the Sino-American MutualDefense Treaty, the Court heard no oral arguments, vacated the D.C. Circuit’sopinion, and ordered the district court to dismiss the case.) EPA v. Mink, 410.S. 73 (1973) (denying an attempt by members of Congress attain top-secretinformation about an underground nuclear test under FOIA) nitedPresbyterian Church in the .S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1382 (D.C. Cir.1984) (finding lack of standing where a member of Congress and otherschallenged the legality of Executive Order No. 12,333, which established anintelligence gathering framework) Harrington v. ush, 553 F.2d 190, 199(D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that a member of the House lacked standing in alawsuit to en oin the CIA from engaging in illegal activities).173. Shirin Sinnar, Procedural E perimentation and ational Security in the Courts,106 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 997 (2018).174. d. at 1000.175. Robert M. Chesney, ational Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1424(2009).
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Congressional leaders can effectively respond to each of these claims.Gang of Eight lawsuits do not require courts to rule on the legality of ICprograms. Instead, these lawsuits simply ask courts to determine whetherthe president lawfully withheld an IC program from Congress. Courts aremore likely to permit these lawsuits due to their narrow ambit.udicial deference to the executive is not carte blanche and courtsface a perpetual dilemma of how to provide a udicial check against trulyimproper action without hamstringing or unduly delaying workablegovernment. 176 Recently, in Department of Commerce v. ew York,177 Chiefustice Roberts noted that courts can be less deferential to the executivebranch when plaintiffs have made a strong showing of bad faith orimproper behavior on the part of the executive. Gang of Eight lawsuitsallege that the executive is acting unlawfully, which may encourage courtsto be less deferential to the president.Furthermore, courts may be encouraged to support congressionaloversight of the IC given the American public’s increasing consternationover theWar on Terror. This Note proposes Gang of Eight lawsuits at a timein which the nited States is involved in a WarWithout End. 178 As a resultof the War on Terror, the American public has become tired of the failuresof the nited States’ militari ed foreign policy. 179 udges are not immunefrom popular opinion . . . and can face real consequences when issuingdecisions that are manifestly contrary to public will. 180 The public’sincreasing frustration with the War on Terror may augur against completedeference to the executive on national security matters.Finally, congressional leaders can effectively argue that Gang of Eightlawsuits will not impair the president’s ability to quickly and unilaterallyrespond to exigent national security events. ecause these lawsuits do not
176. David A. Martin, E ecutive Discretion and Judicial Deference After the Census
Case he Chief Justice s i htrope, LAWFARE ( ul. 23, 2019, 12:06 PM),https: www.lawfareblog.com executive-discretion-and- udicial-deference-after-census-case-chief- ustices-tightrope https: perma.cc P 4-D 7W .177. 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019).178. C. . Chivers, War Without End, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 8, 2018),https: www.nytimes.com 2018 08 08 maga ine war-afghanistan-iraq-soldiers.html https: perma.cc E4 E-D8D4 .179. Stephen Miles, Americans Are Sick of Endless War, NATION ( une 21, 2018),https: www.thenation.com article americans-sick-endless-warhttps: perma.cc 8Z R-V L .180. Scott M. Sullivan, Judicial Deference and Democratic alues, 53 T LSA L. REV.363, 368 (2018).
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ask courts to rule on the legality of the IC program, courts need not worryabout improperly impeding IC programs critical to national security.
D. he Gan of Ei ht Committee Will ot ndermine HPSC and SSC s
Role in verseein the CThe creation of the Gang of Eight Committee will not undermine HPSCIand SSCI’s role in overseeing the IC. Critics of this Note’s proposal maycontend that, after the Committee is created, the president may considerreplacing intelligence programs with military programs to impedecongressional oversight. Alternatively, critics may allege that theCommittee will undermine the relative importance of HPSCI and SSCI.Neither criticism is accurate. nder this Note’s proposal, HPSCI and SSCIwill retain their role regulating the American intelligence community.The creation of the Gang of Eight Committee will not incentivi e thepresident to replace IC programs with military programs. Surely, thepresident likely has the ability to authori e at least some IC programs underTitle 10 (which authori es military operations) rather than Title 50 (whichauthori es most intelligence programs).181 However, Title 50 programsoften provide the president with greater statutory authority to withholdsensitive operations from Congress.182 Furthermore, members of the
181. Since 9 11, military and intelligence activities have become increasinglyintegrated. MICHAELE.DEVINE HEIDIM.PETERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45175,COVERT ACTION AND CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMM NITY:SELECTED DEFINITIONS IN RIEF 4 (2018). Further, the differentiation in thepurview between military and CIA operations is not always clear. . Robertane, Covert Action, Military perations and the D D
C A Debate, REAL CLEAR DEF. (Aug. 9, 2018),https: www.realcleardefense.com articles 2018 08 09 covert actionmilitary operations and the dodcia debate 113701.htmlhttps: perma.cc 7TG4- L6T . The increasing similarity between manyTitle 10 military activities and Title 50 intelligence activities empowers theexecutive with significant flexibility. For example, the military can conductOperational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) operations that are oftenseen as a pseudo-covert action that is authori ed under Title 10. See ane,
supra note 181. HPSCI has expressed concern that there is a blurreddistinction between the intelligence-gathering activities carried out by theCIA and the clandestine operations of the DOD . H.R. REP. NO. 111-186, at48 (2009).182. For example, under 10 .S.C. 130(f), the Secretary of Defense is required toinform the congressional defense committees of any sensitive militaryoperation conducted under this title no later than 48 hours following such
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intelligence committees typically have less experience in overseeing the ICcompared with other oversight committees.183 ecause the presidentretains strong incentives to continue authori ing intelligence programsthroughTitle 50,HPSCI and SSCI’s oversight capacitywill not be diminished.Alternatively, critics of the Gang of Eight Committee may argue that, byformali ing the Gang of Eight, Congress may reduce the relative importanceof the congressional intelligence committees. Such arguments ignore theoverall purpose of the Committee: ensuring HPSCI and SSCI are fullyinformed about IC programs. The Committee will not be empowered toenact legislation or interfere with HPSCI and SSCI’s intelligenceappropriations process. And, asmentioned in Section II.C.3, Congress exertsmost of its influence over the IC through the intelligence appropriationsprocess. If congressional leaders can ensure that HPSCI and SSCI are fullyinformed of the scope of IC programs, the intelligence committees will bebetter able to regulate the IC through the appropriations process.CONCL SIONThe great gulf between the interbranch cooperation prescribed by theConstitution and the current reality of unilateral executive action in issuesof national security indicates that Congress may need to be creative toreassert its oversight role over the IC.184 Congress is unlikely to frequentlyfile Gang of Eight lawsuits. Typically, disputes between Congress and thepresident have been resolved through negotiation and political
operation. 10 .S.C. 130(f). Sensitivemilitary operations include operationsconducted by military personnel outside a declared theater and sensitivemilitary cyber operations. DEVINE PETERS, supra note 181. nlike a Title 50operation, these operations cannot be withheld from congress or briefed tocongressional leaders, but not the entire defense committee.183. HPSCI has committee-specific term limits that greatly reduce the relativeexpertise of the committee members. See Zegart, supra note 150, at 10 ( Notsurprisingly, term limits have created substantial experience gaps betweenthe intelligence committees and Congress’s other oversight committees. ).Furthermore, congressionalmembers have farmore experienceworkingwiththe Department of Defense than the IC. While the armed services committeeshave typically been comprised of more than one-third veterans, Congressrarely has any members with experience in the IC. d. at 6.184. Neumeister, supra note 141, at 2530.
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accommodation, without resort to the udicial process. 185 Nevertheless,Congress should consider all possibilities in increasing congressionaloversight of the IC.nder the status quo, the Gang of Eight is essentially powerless tocounter the president’s decision to unlawfully withhold non-covert ICprograms from the intelligence committees.While some reform (such as theremoval of the Gang of Eight carveout) may be preferable to congressionallawsuits, Congress must act strategically and acknowledge that its avenuesfor reform are severely limited by the presidential veto.Gang of Eight lawsuits provide Congress with a powerful regulatorytool. These lawsuits can constrain executive power and can signal to theAmerican public that congressional leaders are using every tool possible toconstrain unlawful presidential action. Furthermore, Gang of Eightsubpoenas can empower congressional leaders to better understandongoing intelligence programs and to exact a political cost on the executive’sdecision to withhold IC programs from Congress.This Note does not propose (and certainly cannot produce) a completesolution to Congress’s oversight problems. Nevertheless, the Gang of EightCommittee is an oversight tool that can, at least on the margins,substantively improve congressional oversight of the most sensitive ICprograms.In accordance with ustice ackson’s traditional Youn stown analysis ofpresidential power, the president often operates in absence of either acongressional grant or denial of authority. 186 When working in this oneof twilight . . . congressional inertia, indifference or quiescencemay . . . enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidentialresponsibility. 187 ustice ackson’s widely adopted concurrence makesclear that the president’s powers are not fixed, but fluctuate, dependingupon their dis unction or con unction with those of Congress. 188Courts often consider historic norms between Congress and thepresident in ad udicating disputes between the co-equal branches ofgovernment. If the executive continues to advocate for a narrowing oflegislative standing, and Congress remains silent, courts may narrowcongressional standing. The Gang of Eight Committee provides a natural
185. na Lee, Reinterpretin Raines Le islator Standin to Enforce Con ressional
Subpoenas, 98 GEO. L. . 1165, 1167 (2010).186. Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 .S. 579, 637 (1952) ( ackson, .,concurring).187. d.188. d. at 635.
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way for Congress to affirmatively defend its understanding of legislativestanding. The Constitution created a government of shared governancebetween co-equal branches of government. The Gang of Eight Committee isdedicated to this idea of equality.
